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LABOR RELATIONS: RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY SENIORITY SYSTEM
UNJUSTIFIED BY BUSINESS NECESSITY
HELD TO VIOLATE TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
in Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,'
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a sen-
iority system which carries forward the effects of former dis-
criminatory practices violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Prior to 1964 Crown Zellerbach Corporation, the
employer involved in the case, maintained two racially segregated
lines of progression in which even the lowliest "white" jobs
were more desirable than "Negro" jobs and in which job sen-
iority was the basis of promotion.2 In 1966 the progression lines,
were merged on the basis of existing pay rates with the general
result that "Negro" lines were tacked to the bottom of "white"
lines? Job seniority based on existing pay rates continued to lock
Negroes into "Negro" jobs since seniority in "white" jobs
regardless of qualifications was a prerequisite in awarding all but
the lowest level "white" jobs. In 1968 Crown Zellerbach adopted a
promotion system combining job seniority and mill seniority
despite a strike threat by the white union.4 After obtaining an
injunction against the White union's strike and before
implementation of the 1968 system,5 the government filed suit
under Title VII against Crown and the white union, asking that
job seniority not be a basis of promotion. The district court
ordered implementation of a promotion system based upon mill
seniority "in all circumstances in which one or more competing
employees is a Negro hired prior to January 16, 1966."1 The Court
of Appeals affirmed
I F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969). Although the United Paperworkers and the employer,
Crown Zellerbach Corporation, are also appellants, the primary party in interest is Crown
Zellerbach.
2 See id. at .
'Id. at _.
Id. at _. "Mill seniority" is the total length of time worked at the mill on all jobs.
'United States v. Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39, 41. (E.D.
La. 1968).
6 Id. at 41. For an explanation of the district court's later order, see Local 189, Paper-
makers & Paperworkers v. United States, - F.2d __, (5th Cir. 1969).
7 - F.2d at - .
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An analysis of the legislative history of Title VII is useful in
determining whether seniority rights are immune from the
provisions of Title VII. Section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an
employer to adversely affect an employee's status by classification
on the basis of race.8 While section 703(h) allows an employer to
utilize a seniority system which is not based on racial
discrimination,9 section 706(g) requires the court to find that the
discrimination was intentionally engaged in before it can enjoin the
discrimination and issue a corrective order. " Because the Civil
RPights Act of 1964 was never referred to a Senate Committee, its
legislative history is the source of some confusion concerning the
immunity of seniority rights under Title VII. Senator Clark's
statements that "[s]eniority rights are in no way affected by the
bill" and that the "[b]ill is not retroactive"" provide sup-
port for the interpretation that seniority rights are immune from
Title VII. Other factors suggest an opposite conclusion. Senator
Clark did not deal with job seniority but responded to the fear of
senior white workers being displaced by junior Negro workers with
less mill seniority. 12 Further, reading Clark's comments to prohibit
the use of evidence of past discrimination in determining if a
present seniority system is discriminatory would make it difficult to
determine if a system is bona fide and would render Title VII
ineffective.13 The "in any way" language of section 703(a)(2)" is
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1964). "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer-. . . (2) to limit, segregate or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color ... ." Id.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). -[I]t shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards . . . pursuant to
a bona fide.seniority . . . system . . . provided such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color. ... Id.
0 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
" 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
2See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968); M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 72 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SOVERN]; Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glininter of Hope,
23 RUrGERS L. REV. 269, 287 (1969); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on
Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (1969).
"3 Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 22 (1967).
,1 See note 8 supra.
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very broad and suggests that Congress intended to reach all
present discrimination including that incorporated into seniority
systems.' 5 This suggestion is not narrowed by Section 703(h) which
is simply an assurance that bona fide seniority systems not based
on race are lawful. 6 Further, the union's duty to represent all of its
members "without hostile discrimination against them" as set
forth in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 17 and extended to cover all
workers' s represented by any union 9 prohibits differences in
seniority based on race.0 That seniority rights are not immune
under the Steele doctrine would suggest that Congress did not
intend them to be so under Title VII ,2 Although the "intentional"
requirement of section 706(g) could be interpreted as making
seniority immune from the provisions of the Act, the record shows
that Senator Dirksen inserted the word "willfully," later amended
to "intentionally," to distinguish an intentional act from an
accidental act2 Thus, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 suggests that seniority systems were not intended to be
immune and that whether a specific system violates Title VII must
be judicially determined.
Although the district courts uniformly have determined that a
business necessity test should be used in seniority cases under Title
VII and have generally adopted, a "rightful place" approach,2 sig-
nificant confusion has been created as to whether Title VII requires
a specific intent to discriminate and whether a seniority system
which maintains differences based on prior lawful discrimination
violates Title VII. Because courts have not provided definite
1 Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employnent Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion. 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1611-14
(1969).
"6See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968); Blumrosen,
supra note 12, at 291; Cooper & Sobol, supra note 15, at 1612-14; Vass. Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. IND. & Co. t. L. REv. 431,449 (1966).
" 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944); see Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 273-76.
"3 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB. 323 U.S. 248 (1948).
11 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
"Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 846 (1956).
21 Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias: A History, a Status Report, and a
Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259, 310 (1968).
22 110 CONG. REC. 8194 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen); see Local 189, Papermakers
& Paperworkers v. United States, - F.2d -, - (5th Cir. 1969); Blumrosen, supra
note 12, at 282-83; Cooper& Sobol, supra note 15, at 1674-75.
21 See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
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guidelines defining the "business necessity" which will justify a
discriminatory seniority system, a case by case analysis is desirable.
In Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,"4 where segregated lines of work
were abandoned and "white" and "Negro" jobs did not require
different abilities, the court ordered that mill seniority be the basis
of promotion upon a finding that the impairment of efficiency,
expense of retraining, and disturbance of junior employees' pro rotion
expectations did not justify limiting transfers to "white" jobs or
conditioning promotion to higher "white" jobs on job seniority!5
However, when differences in the skill and training required for a
"Ngro" job and a "white" job have been significant, business
necessity has been found to justify job promotion systems which
carry forward the effects of prior discrimination.2 Thus, in United
States v. Hayes International Corp.,2 7 where the difference was be-
tween maintenance and airplane repairing, a 24 week residency
requirement was upheld for Negroes transferring into "white"
jobs.2 1 Similarly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 29 where the
difference was between laborer and other higher departments,
business necessity was found to justify a high school education
requirement for transfer from the "Negro" laborer department.30
In contrast, no business necessity was found when a union's referral
system was based on a nepotic membership requirement which
had no relation to one's ability to do the work 3 In another area of
judicial consistency in applying Title VII to seniority provisions,
most courts have adopted a "rightful place" theory which allows
qualified Negroes to bid on job vacancies on the basis of mill
seniority 2 Because this approach limits the disruptive effects on
1 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
21 Id. at 520-21.
26 See Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
902 (1959) (decided under the Steele doctrine). For criticism of Whitfield see Blumrosen,
supra note 12, at 294.
2' 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.C. Ala. 1968).
I Id. at 808-09.
2 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
Id. at 25 1.
3' United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1969); Local
53, Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
1 E.g.. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505, 510, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968); cf
Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARM. L. REV.
1260, 1268 (1967). See also Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 303-04.
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white workers without sacrificing the rights of the Negro workers and
maintains the employer's efficiency, it has been called a "delib-
erate speed" approach.3 Two other methods are the "status
quo" approach which would allow seniority systems to be immune
and the "freedom now" approach which would allov Negroes to
replace white workers with less seniority.3 Although most cases have
not discussed the intent necessary to violate Title VII, one case, in
dictum, seems to require a specific intent,35 while an analogy to
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,31 which held that the National
Labor Relations Board had the power, to infer intention from the
factual setting,3 7 would lead to an opposite result.38 Commentators
have urged that no specific intent requirement be imposed because of
the nature of discrimination39 and that the intent can be inferred
from pre-1965 discrimination if the consequences were foreseeable at
the time of the discrimination." With the only case41
finding that present discrimination must be based on prior unlawful
discrimination having been overruled 4 2 the possibility of applying the
unlawfulness requirement from other civil rights areas, which the
court in Local 189 feared, would seem to be quite small. This possi-
bility would seem to be eliminated by Gaston County v. United
States4 3 which held invalid a literacy test which carried forward the
effects of the lawful, pre-Brown44 inferior education received by
Negroes in segregated schools. 4 5 Even if the unlawfulness requirement
m Id. at. 1274.
Id. at 1268-69.
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
347 U.S. 17 (1954).
31 Id. at 52.
33 Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications. 47
TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1052-53 (1969). Cf. NLRB v. Local 267, IBEW, 357 F.2d 51, 55 (3d
Cir. 1966).
" Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN
L. R-iv. 62, 71 (1964). See Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 281; Cooper & Sobol, supra note 15,
at 1675.
'See Jenkins, supra note 21, at 311.
' United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
n United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1969).
395 U.S. 285 (1969).
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Spitz, Tailoring the Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination,
14 BUFFALO L. REV. 79, 82 (1964).
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were imposed, the Steele doctrine,4 which has been extended to cover
both union and management,47 would appear to make prior racial dis-
crimination illegal. With vagueness as to what constitutes "business
necessity" and confusion as to the requirements of employer intent
and prior unlawfulness, there is a lack of consistency in adjudicating
seniority cases under Title VI I.
The Fifth Circuit in Local 189 adopted a three-step approach
which involves finding discrimination, determining business
necessity, and issuing a triangularly adjusted decree, premised on
an interpretation of Title VII that seniority systems are not
immune from section 703(h). First, to determine if a violation of
Title VII exists, the court held that under Crown Zellerbach's
seniority system Negroes ". . will lose promotions which, but ]br
their race, they would surely have won" and concluded that the
effects of past discrimination were being carried forward.48 In finding
present discrimination, the court interpreted the requirements of
prior unlawfulness and employer intent. Adopting the Gaston County
rationaleI5 the court did not require that the prior discrimination
be unlawful, but only that prior discrimination affect the present job
patterns. In finding that intention may be inferred from actions before
the effective date of Title VII, the court required only that one
meant to do what was done, rather than requiring that present
discrimination result from a specific intention to discriminate!"
Second, the court held that Crown Zellerbach's discrimination was
unjustified by business necessity which it defined as ". . . an over-
riding legitimate, non-racial business purpose.' The court found
that job seniority was not essential to plant efficiency or safety, and
that the problems of labor unrest and training could be minimized by
a well-fashioned order. 2 Finally, the court adopted the district court's
order based on the "rightful place" theory which adjusts the triangu-
See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
17 Independent Metal Workers Local I, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); see Anderson, Civil
Rights and Fair Entployinent, 22 Bus. LAW. 513, 514 (1967).
For a related extension of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, see United
Packinghouse v. NLRB, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969).
-"F.2d at _.
n See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
F.2d at .
Id. at -.
SId. at .
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lar interests of minority group employees, white employees, and
management. 53 The court rejected a "freedom now ' 54 approach
because such an approach would displace incumbent whites,
aggravate labor unrest, and violate the intent of Title VII .5 The
court also rejected the "status quo" approach as freezing a
generation of black workers, and it provided that all qualified
Negroes can bid on all vacancies in jobs they would have had but
for discrimination.-6 The Court defined "qualified" as requiring
Negroes to first bid for vacancies in the lowest level "white" jobs,
to stay at such a job for a residency period, and to then bid on the
basis of mill seniority for a vacancy on the next job level. 7 By
adopting the district court's order, the Fifth Circuit required that
mill seniority with the above conditions be the basis of promotion.
In justifying the order it adopted, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
order protects management by allowing it to retain its option to
deny promotions to employees who lack the qualifications to do the
job properly, 5 that it protects the white employees by providing
that they will not be displaced from their jobs, and that it protects
the Negro employees by allowing them to bid on job vacancies on
the basis of mill seniority with only those residency requirements
justified by the training needs of the job 9
Local 189 is significant for the outline it provides for future
decisions. The scope of the Act's prohibitions is interpreted to
include present discrimination which results from prior racial
discrimination that has been incorporated into a seniority system
which has no business necessity. This interpretation is in accord
with the legislative history which indicates that seniority rights are
not immune under Title VII and with Section 703(h) which defines
a "bona fide" seniority system as one not based on race."0 By not
" See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 295 F. Supp. 803, 808 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Gould,
Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L.
REV. 1039, 1067-68 (1969).
See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
" . F.2d at -. See Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles
and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1068 (1969).
" . F.2d at -.
'T Id. at -.
I d. at -.
' Id. at _ .
See notes 8-22 supra and accompanying text.
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requiring a specific intent, by allowing inquiry into prior
discrimination, and by not requiring that prior discrimination be
unlawful, the court's holding allows all present discrimination to be
subject to prohibition and is in accordance with the general language
of section 703(a)(2)." By adopting the "rightful place" theory, the
court demonstrates that not all present effects of prior
discrimination violate Title VII and properly adopts a "deliberate
speed" approach 62 which encourages voluntary compliance and
protects the rights of both Negro and white workers. Discovery of
"an overriding legitimate, non-racial business purpose" to ascertain
business necessity requires a case by case determination which
focuses on the interrelation of the "Negro" and "white" jobs in the
areas of skills, abilities, and training. 3 Once the present discrimi-
nation is found to be unlawful, it is desirable that the court consider
all the interests involved and issue a triangularly adjusted decree.
For instance, as the ability and training gap between two jobs
narrows, maintenance of plant efficiency could require shorter resi-
dency requirements and the business necessity justification for job
seniority would lessen. To make its order effective, the court should
try to limit the disruptive effect of its holding so as to assure com-
pliance and still protect the Negroes' rights through such devices as
bump-back provisions, which would enable a Negro transferee to
return to his former job without a loss in seniority, and mill
seniority.64 Further, although the Fifth Circuit makes no ruling on
the validity of company aptitude and skill tests having the same
effect as a discriminatory seniority system, it would be desirable for
future courts to apply the court's three-step reasoning when evaluat-
ing the validity of such tests.
By requiring a comprehensive three-step approach the court is
likely to increase the judicial burden in the area of seniority where
the courts are not "particularly adept ' 65 and where adjudication of
" See note 8 supra.
'2 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text for other factors to consider in
determining business necessity: Quarles (efficiency, nondisturbance of junior employees'
promotion expectations); Hayes (lay-offs, recalls, safety, economical performance of
government contracts); Griggs (upgrading of the labor force, job function); Vogler (trade
relation).
See Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 313.
"Gould, Emplovnent Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII ol the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 30 (1967).
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cases, as compared to the procedures of the National Labor
Relations Board, are more time consuming, more costly, and more
demanding procedurally.6 Three possible methods to ease this
burden are to give enforcement powers to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which was created under Title VII and
which at least one commentator believes will become a "repository of
expertise" in the area,67 to have the courts appoint labor arbitrators
as masters under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8
or to rely more on the National Labor Relations Board, which
seems to have extended Steele to cover management discrimination
in seniority.69 Whichever method is chosen, the three-step approach
of finding discrimination, determining business necessity, and
using a triangularly adjusted decree should provide a sound guide in
deciding future seniority discrimination cases.
"6 SOVERN, supra note 12, at 163; see Herring, The "'Fair Representation" Doctrine: An
Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REV. 113, 146-47, 162-
63 (1964); Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
729, 744, 795-96 (1965).
" Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 31 (1967). See H.R. 6229, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969);
H.R. 6228, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Note, Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues
Between the EEOC and NLRB: A Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 943 (1969).
"Gould, supra note 13, at 31.
Ci See notes 47 and 67 supra. Because the NLRB has only recently asserted its full
jurisdiction in the field of employment discrimination, the Board has not yet been widely
utilized by litigants in this area. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), was the first NLRB decision to hold
that a violation of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice under the Taft-
Hartley Act and that acquiescing management could commit this violation. Independent
Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) extended Miranda to the field of racial
discrimination but was overshadowed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. United Packinghouse
v. NLRB, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969) held that management's independent discrimi-
nation violated the Taft-Hartley Act.
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